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Reproducing remoteness? States, internationals and the
co-constitution of aid ‘bunkerization’ in the East African
periphery
Jonathan Fisher
International Development Department, University of Birmingham
ABSTRACT
The physical and social retreat of international interveners behind
the walls of ‘bunkered’ aid compounds in (putatively) more
remote and dangerous regions of the South has been the focus of
growing critical attention in recent years. An increasingly remote
and fearful culture of risk aversion and differentiation among
Western states and organizations has been largely identified as
the driving force behind this set of practices. This article presents
a different perspective on the bunkerization phenomenon
through focusing on the agency of Southern states in the process.
Exploring bunkerization across eastern/central Africa—and in
Ethiopia’s eastern Somali region in particular—the study
emphasizes not only how African states have been key promoters
of modern bunkerization, but also how bunkerization behaviour
and mentalities have historically characterized how many African
borderlands—and contemporary sites of international intervention
—have been incorporated into the global state system.
KEYWORDS
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Introduction
No image better captures the apparent physical and emotional withdrawal of the inter-
national aid and peacebuilding industries from the communities they seek to assist
than that of the ‘fortified aid compound’. Perhaps most comprehensively and powerfully
unpacked by Mark Duffield in the pages of this journal (Duffield 2010), the militarized
structures which house and ‘protect’ UN, International Non-governmental Organization
and other international interveners in South Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia and elsewhere
stand as a commanding metaphor for a conscious and fearful demarcation and defence
of a separate ‘lifeworld’ (Rossi 2006) by ‘internationals’ in the midst of a foreign land.
These compounds contain and secure the comforts and accoutrements of everyday life
for their inhabitants (Higate and Henry 2010; Smirl 2015). Access is, however, restricted
to a pre-cleared class of international associates—those who dwell within and subscribe
to Severine Autesserre’s ‘dominant peacebuilding culture’ (2010, 2014)—with local
actors not simply excluded but posited as unpredictable and threatening.
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For these and other scholars, the compound is the manifestation of a much broader
process of mental and physical ‘bunkerization’ undergone throughout the international
aid community in the context of an increasing militarization and securitization of develop-
ment since the 1990s. A growing loss of ‘ground truth’ among interveners has followed, it
is suggested, founded ultimately in risk aversion and a decline in solidarity between the
North and South (Duffield 2010, 2014; Sandstrom 2014). Crucially, it is argued, this
process is a relatively new one (Duffield 2014, S82–S83).
The purpose of this article is to propose an alternative lens through which to under-
stand international remoteness and aid militarization, critically examining the role of
Southern states themselves in the aid bunkerization phenomenon. In doing so, the
article unpacks the linkages between historical patterns and practices of statebuilding
on the one hand and contemporary international bunkerization on the other, focusing par-
ticularly on central and eastern Africa.
For in much of eastern Africa, state expansion, consolidation and governance by colo-
nial, post-colonial and proto-colonial polities since the nineteenth century has contained
marked similarities to those patterns of behaviour highlighted above. Indeed, governance
through militarized encounters, garrisoned outposts and chains of local ‘brokers’ is not
purely a feature of the contemporary aid industry in the peripheries of Sudan, Uganda
and Ethiopia but, in many respects, how the state and its technologies themselves
came to parts of the African borderland.
The drawing of this link is not intended as a device for suggesting that today’s interven-
tionary practices in the South are simply an unconscious extension of underlying, historical
practices of—often exploitative—governance. Instead, the aim is to feel a new path in the
current literature on bunkerization which has, to date, largely overlooked the role of
Southern states in driving the phenomenon and in shaping Western encounters with,
and thus understandings of, many Southern communities. This is undertaken in the
second part of the article through an exploration of contemporary ‘bunkerized’ interven-
tionary practices in the Somali region of eastern Ethiopia (Somali Regional State or SRS).
This latter section of the article draws upon interviews undertaken with senior, mid-
level and operational officials in UN agencies, Western embassies and aid agencies,
INGOs, implementing bodies, consultancy groups, risk analysis outfits and Ethiopian
state officials between March and May 2014—all of whose focus has been on activities
in SRS. Almost all respondents requested anonymity owing to the perceived political or
commercial sensitivity of the information being provided (on security protocols, risk
assessment procedures, development of funding bids etc.). Consequently, while as
much information as possible is provided, interviewees are cited without reference to
names or, in some cases, organizations. Where the same designation is used for multiple
interviewees, separate interviews are indicated with numbers (e.g. ‘Interview with UN offi-
cial 2’). The remainder of the paper builds upon secondary literature along with interviews
with international and state officials undertaken across the region in 12 fieldwork visits
since 2009.
In terms of case selection, the choice of the central/eastern African region reflects the
heavy concentration of international intervention and bunkerization behaviour there since
the 1990s. The comparatively high number of attacks on, and killings of, aid workers across
this region—conceived of, by many, as a key driver of bunkerization protocols and bunker-
ized living by internationals—is also a central consideration.1 The varied nature and
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strength of the pre-/post-colonial and colonial state across the region also provides a valu-
able differentiation of contexts in which to compare and contrast the relationship between
statebuilding, intervention and state ‘hardness’/‘softness’. For while the Ethiopian case
study alone might be seen as exceptional, given the historical strength and territorial
reach of that state’s political and security machinery, the fact that similar phenomena
can be identified elsewhere in the region in states with historically much more distant
relationships with peripheries underlines the broader regional generalizability of the
article’s findings.
The article begins by unpacking the literature on bunkerization before drawing parallels
between practices identified here and those undertaken in many east African border
regions during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The SRS case is then analysed
with a particular focus placed on the role of the contemporary Ethiopian state in promot-
ing bunkerization practices among modern international interveners. The piece concludes
by arguing for a greater appreciation of the role of states—and historical practices of sta-
tebuilding—in scholarly analyses of international intervention and knowledge
construction.
A note on terminology
The terminological characterization of different categories of actors at intervention sites
stands at something of an impasse in contemporary critical peacebuilding scholarship.
The binary distinction drawn by many policymakers and scholars between ‘international’
and ‘national’/‘local’ is problematic in its degree of imprecision and essentialization
(Heathershaw 2013). The lines between staff of donor institutions, aid agencies, INGOs,
contractors and other ‘aid workers’, for example, are exceptionally blurred in many inter-
vention sites, not only because the latter are often the implementers of the formers’ pro-
grammes but also because ‘local’ or ‘national’ staff frequently play a prominent role in
many donor/INGO institutions in these contexts (Collinson and Duffield 2013).
Likewise, the notion of a ‘local’ or ‘national’ actor, as distinct from an ‘international’
one, obscures the vast differentiations relevant to any specific context. In Ethiopia, for
example, highlander administrators and security personnel recruited and dispatched to
oversee aid projects or other governance activities are perceived quite differently by low-
landers in SRS than those recruited from SRS itself; the former would certainly not be seen
as ‘local’ by communities living in SRS, even if they are perceived as such by international
organizations. The question of shared or hybridized worldviews and epistemologies (Mac
Ginty 2011) is also poorly captured in international/national/local distinctions, particularly
given the fact, as Autesserre (2014) and Heathershaw (2016) argue, that the frames of
reference and habitus for those working in intervention sites can be more meaningful
to them than national or organizational origins. ‘Local’ terminologies have also been cri-
tiqued for their romanticization of non-Western epistemologies and processes and for
their normative, as opposed to conceptual, dimensions (Randazzo 2016).
Scholars have attempted to resolve some of these ambiguities through qualifying some
of these terms (e.g. Oliver Richmond’s local‒local and local‒international) or through
suggesting alternative categories of actor altogether (Heathersaw 2016; Richmond
2011). It remains the case, however, in this author’s view, that a language that can recog-
nize some of the important distinctions mentioned above at the level of abstraction
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required to render broader conclusions on the relationships between intervention and
power has yet to be developed—and is perhaps impossible to develop satisfactorily.
This article will therefore use specific terminology where possible but will use the term
‘internationals’ to refer to individuals employed by a multilateral or bilateral donor
agency without consideration of their nationality as well as those Western employees of
INGOs and consultancy firms working on and in SRS. Civilians and communities in inter-
vention contexts will be referred to as ‘local’ while state officials will be referred to as
that, with their status as regional, national or federal employees specified where possible.
‘Defensive living’ between two worlds: bunkerization and intervention
The recognition and conceptualization of the defensive and militarized world of contem-
porary international intervention emerged from two key areas of enquiry. The first origi-
nated in debates in the 1990s on ‘human security’ and the relationship between
‘development’ and ‘security’—both in terms of their symbiotic conceptual link but also
the implications of this for developmental interventions (Beall, Goodfellow, and Putzel
2006; Collier and Hoeffler 1999; Sen 1999; Stewart 2004). 9/11 and a range of military inter-
ventions by Western states—particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq but also Sierra Leone—
nevertheless re-shaped this debate around the question of how far developmental
resources were being ‘hijacked’ for military and defence purposes by Western donors,
INGOs and others (Albrecht and Jackson 2015; Woods 2005).
The ever more blurred line between development project and security enterprise in the
post-9/11 context has been the subject of heated debate among scholars and practitioners
—not least because of a growing focus by the UN and Western governments on ‘re-con-
structing’ or, at least, ‘stabilizing’ ‘fragile states’ (Mac Ginty 2012). For scholars such as
Duffield, this reflects not just a cynical commandeering of Northern policy agendas by
security cliques but forms part of a much wider and insidious attempt by neo-liberal North-
ern elites to regulate and govern the everyday lives of those in the South (Duffield 2001a,
2001b, 2007).
This critical commentary on the ‘securitization of development’—which continues to
rage—has increasingly come to focus on the spatial dimensions of intervention and aid
delivery. The provision of aid supplies by Western security personnel in Afghanistan,
Kenya and elsewhere, for example, have been viewed as a conspicuous indication of
aid securitization and militarization (Bradbury and Kleinman 2009; Fishstein and Wilder
2011 and Saferworld 2011). Scholars such as Lisa Smirl, however, have sought to
deepen and develop this critique from a more sociological perspective, examining the
militarized and separated architectures which house contemporary aid workers and
help facilitate their interactions with ‘locals’ (Bliesemann de Guevara 2016; Smirl 2008,
2015, 2016).
The sociology of international aid workers, or peacebuilders/peacekeepers, has also
been the focus of a second body of work where the concern has been to analyse how
international interveners view and approach their work and how they experience inter-
action with proximate Southern communities. For many, entry into this area of enquiry
has come through critique of international actors who are unable to shift from a
Western-centred, ‘blueprint’ worldview to one which takes account of local perspectives
and priorities (Autesserre 2010; Lemay-Hébert 2009; Mac Ginty 2008). For others, the
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deleterious impact of ‘everyday’ practices of interveners—culminating in the creation of
‘peacekeeping economies’—have been of central importance (Aning and Edu-Afful 2013;
Edu-Afful and Aning 2015; Higate and Henry 2004; Jennings 2014, 2015; Jennings and Bøås
2015).
Critical to this article, though, is the way in which this latter literature in particular has
introduced a coherent concept of the international interventionary community. The deli-
neation of a separate ‘peacekeeping culture’ has not only highlighted the architectural
and spatial barriers and divisions erected by internationals, but the whole ‘lifeworld’ of
this community—including how they construct, often erroneous, understandings of
societies they engage with (Autesserre 2010, 2014; Rossi 2006). Analysts depict a group
whose everyday living is calibrated to limit contact with the ‘local’ for fear of attack,
disease or other risk, while mind-sets engendered and preserved are those of separate-
ness, privilege and difference (Autesserre 2014; Cain, Postlewait, and Thomson 2006). Duf-
field’s analysis of the fortified aid compound brings these strands of literature together—
with the compound standing not only for bunkerized space but bunkerized lifestyles.
It is important, however, to clarify the two dimensions of bunkerization that Duffield and
others havedeveloped:militarization and remoteness. The compound constitutes part of the
former, which includes reinforced vehicles and security protocols. It also incorporates,
however, the use of security and military forces to distribute or implement development
or humanitarian goods—or, at least, to oversee these processes and ‘protect’ their provi-
ders. Thus one can see bunkerization in contexts where militarized compounds are less
present, or wholly absent—such as eastern Chad, eastern Ethiopia or northern Kenya.
The other side of bunkerization, however, is ‘remoteness’—the physical withdrawal of
international personnel from key sites. On the one hand, this involves internationals’
retreat to capital cities (sometimes in other countries) and engagement in periodic,
brief ‘fly-in’ visits to areas in question. Throughout the 1990s, for example, many interna-
tionals dealing with war-torn northern Uganda based themselves in Kampala, while
Nairobi became the home for many of their counterparts engaged ‘in’ Somalia—as
Dubai and Jordan have become for internationals focused upon Iraq and Syria. This
clearly has implications for the types of knowledge produced in Western diplomatic
and developmental circles on regions beyond the metropolis (Fisher 2014; Roberts 2013).
On the other hand, remoteness entails the growing transfer of responsibility for under-
taking, managing and evaluating internationally funded interventions by national staff
and NGOs that are rarely afforded the same security resources as their Northern counter-
parts. This perhaps affords these actors a greater degree of agency in terms of implemen-
tation—and, indeed, shaping knowledge production processes—than might be possible
under a more directly managed arrangement (Lewis and Mosse 2006). It also, however,
transfers security risks identified by internationals to the local level (Shaw 2005) and
raises difficult questions about whether international interventions are being
implemented as intended or even if they are informed by any real sense of community
concerns on the ground (Sandstrom 2014).
The inclusion of remoteness within our understanding of bunkerization is important for
addressing one of the more central criticisms of the concept: its UN-centricity. Duffield,
Autesserre, Henry and others focus heavily on UN peacekeepers and peacebuilders in
their analyses. Their analyses therefore potentially aptly characterize phenomena in peace-
keeping intervention sites such as Afghanistan, Somalia and South Sudan where the UN is
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the dominant international actor, but not in regions where the UN role is less central, such
as parts of Ethiopia, Chad and Uganda.2 Incorporating remoteness into bunkerization,
however, allows us to apply the concept to many other interventionary contexts and
organizations—particularly those where UN norms and protocols are less stringently
observed and where multiple, mid-sized interventionary enterprises are the norm.
Where bunkerization’s analytical purchase remains somewhat weak, however, is in its
explanation of the drivers of the phenomenon. For most commentators, it is the initiative
and agency of international actors and organizations that underlies the practice and men-
tality. While contestation of the material change in risk encountered by internationals in
recent times forms a prominent part of this literature, broad agreement exists on the
notion that internationals have deliberately driven the practice in reaction to perceived
risk. This also appears to be the view of many practitioners themselves; Felix da Costa
cites one INGO official in South Sudan’s observation that ‘bunkerization is essentially
led by donors’ (2012, 7).
There is good reason, however, to query the decisiveness of this characterization. For
example, a range of literature has recently explored the extent to which access and secur-
ity is ‘negotiated’ between internationals and governments in many parts of the South,
with security escorts and risk management plans imposed by the latter on internationals
in an effort—in some cases—to strategically manage how Western knowledge on those
states is produced (Del Valle and Healy 2013; Fisher 2014, 2015; Harvey 2013; Magone,
Neuman, and Weissman 2012; Pottier 2002).
More broadly, many scholars have highlighted the agency of African states in the inter-
national system in a number of contexts, underlining the extent to which apparent
relationships of dependency and domination are in fact imbued with opportunities for
securing agency on both sides (Beswick 2010; Brown and Harman 2011; Fisher 2012; Whit-
field 2009). Mac Ginty, Richmond and other proponents of the ‘local turn’ in peace studies
have also convincingly critiqued the dominance of Northern epistemologies and failed
‘liberal’ frameworks in the prosecution of peacebuilding initiatives by internationals.
Instead, they have argued for a critical unpacking of local or indigenous agency in the
emergence of sustainable peace practices in divided societies—from both a normative
and a pragmatic perspective (Mac Ginty 2008, 2011; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013).
These findings alone merit a more open approach to be taken to the question of what pro-
motes and sustains bunkerization practices in many parts of the developing world.
Moreover, much of what is highlighted on the architectural, operational and practical
side of bunkerization resembles not only contemporary practices of governance and
state consolidation in parts of the South but also much more historic ones—in some
cases practices which have taken place since the pre-colonial era. The remainder of this
article will therefore seek to re-frame the discussion on bunkerization by ‘bringing the
state in’. This will be undertaken firstly through the drawing of parallels between historic
statebuilding practices and contemporary bunkerization, followed by an historically
informed analysis of the drivers of bunkerization in Ethiopia’s SRS.
Genealogies of bunkerization in central-eastern Africa
In recent decades, many of the most prominent humanitarian crises—and focuses of inter-
national intervention in various forms—have been located at the peripheries of central/
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eastern African states. War in northern Uganda, genocide in Darfur, refugee crises in eastern
Chad, conflict in the Ogaden, civil strife in southern Sudan—borderlands have been a focal
point for suffering, atrocities, insurgency and counter-insurgency for much of the recent
past and thus have become the key sites for intervention, directly or otherwise.
A key point to make in this regard is that these regions’ entry into the modern global
system of states—and their subsequent governance—strongly reflect phenomena dis-
cussed and critiqued in the bunkerization literature. Though polities and systems of gov-
ernance existed in all the examples cited above prior to the nineteenth century, the set of
processes which led to their incorporation into the modern states of Uganda, Sudan3,
Chad and Ethiopia and the forms of engagement they have continued to have with gov-
ernments in Kampala, Khartoum, N’Djamena and Addis Ababa to this day closely resemble
both militarization and remoteness, as discussed above. That is to say, statemaking and
statebuilding in the peripheries of these four states has long been associated with the
practices conceptualized as novel and Western-led in much contemporary intervention
literature.
The incorporation of parts of Darfur, western Ethiopia and southern Sudan into what
eventually became (largely) Sudan by Turco-Egyptian forces (with British support) in the
nineteenth century, for example, was undertaken violently and maintained through
crude and exploitative military rule (Leonardi 2013; Gonzalez-Ruibal 2011). Power was
centred around fortified garrisons or zaribas occupied by Turco-Egyptian commanders
and their retainers. Leonardi (2013) has vividly reconstructed the environments of these
‘clearly demarcated and exclusionary’ structures and the local economies which grew
up around them—structures and processes which resemble, from this perspective, Duf-
field’s aid compounds and the development of ‘peacekeeping economies’ (Higate and
Henry 2014; Jennings and Bøås 2015).
Importantly, post-colonial Sudanese governments maintained a similar approach to
ruling the south and west—northern commanders being the main representatives of
the state—housed in military bases to govern and, where necessary, subdue the popu-
lation (Rolandsen and Leonardi 2014; Deng Kuol 2014). Even members of the rebel
Southern People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)—now the ruling party of South Sudan
—have reflected on their militarized approach to engaging with and governing civilians
in occupied territory they held between the 1980s and 2000s.4
Similar observations can be made on the incorporation of modern SRS into Ethiopia.
The region—populated primarily by pastoralist communities—was violently subdued by
the imperial Ethiopian army in the later nineteenth century and left largely ‘ungoverned’
by the centre save for periodic campaigns led by distant military officers stationed in urban
posts and fortified military structures (Hagmann 2014, 14; Markakis 2011, 134–148). The
presence of the state in the region today does not look dissimilar.
Faced with a separatist insurgency since the mid-1990s, the Ethiopian government has,
in SRS expert Tobias Hagmann’s words, ‘returned to [the] garrison rule’ which character-
ized its presence in SRS for much of the twentieth century (Hagmann 2013). Indeed,
Hagmann and Korf characterize successive Ethiopian regimes’ approaches to SRS in
terms of Carl Schmitt’s and Giorgio Agamben’s ‘state of exception’, noting that ‘physical
violence meted out by subsequent Ethiopian governments has been a constant in the past
120 years’ (Hagmann and Korf 2012, 209). In illustrating this point, Hagmann refers to
topographic maps of the Somali region produced by Ethiopia’s official Mapping Agency
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during the 1970s ‘which depict major towns and settlements within the Ogaden as “mili-
tary camps” with no reference made to the existing (Somali) names of these locations’
(Hagmann 2005a, 532, note 6).
North-western Kenya, northern and north-eastern Uganda and eastern Chad were also
violently incorporated into their modern states by a combination of European and Turco-
Egyptian colonial projects and have continued to be governed as enemy territory, to some
degree, by state officials (Knighton 2003). David Anderson, for example, traces the conti-
nuities between the militarized character of British colonial rule in northern Kenya
—‘always treated as a “special district” under a system of military administration… garri-
son government’—and the post-independence regimes of Jomo Kenyatta (1963–78) and
Daniel arap Moi (1978–2002) (Anderson 2014, 660).
Perhaps most startling in this regard, though, was the militarization of much of northern
Uganda during the 1990s and the forced displacement and encampment of millions of
civilians by the Ugandan army in its war against the Lord’s Resistance Army (Dolan
2009). During this period, the state and the military were once again synonymous for
many civilians; the president, Yoweri Museveni, temporarily moved the government to
the region during the mid-1990s, not to oversee the humanitarian operation but ‘to
command the army there himself’.5
Remoteness has also been a central characteristic of state ‘presence’ in these regions
since the nineteenth century. Thus in nineteenth/early twentieth century eastern Ethiopia
and Darfur, local militias and auxiliaries were often employed as proxies to maintain state
control by distant commanders—not unlike Khartoum’s approach to janjawiid militias in
Darfur during the 2000s and Addis Ababa’s use of the liyumilitia in SRS. Indeed, as Øystein
Rolandsen notes, ‘throughout the history of Sudan as a state, autonomous armed groups
have been employed as slave raiders, auxiliary troops, border police and… tools in gov-
ernment counterinsurgency campaigns… employing militias has become a standard pro-
cedure for successive regimes in Khartoum’ (2007, 165).
More often, though, the state came to maintain its rule through relationships of
(unequal) mutual dependency with local leaders (actual or appointed by state officials),
particularly chiefs in southern Sudan/northern Uganda and clan elders in Somali-inhabited
regions (Amone and Muura 2014). These selectively chosen actors became the voice and
arm of the state in many of these peripheral regions owing to their perceived ability to
mobilize support and to ‘translate’ the demands of government to distant communities
which administrators were unwilling to reach out to themselves (Markakis 2011).
Significantly, though, these leaders were valuable because they could speak the
language of their colonial or proto-colonial overlords (both literally and metaphori-
cally)—something which was not a coincidence. Leonardi (2013) has shown, for
example, how southern Sudan’s pre-colonial community leaders transformed into chiefs
during their growing encounters with various manifestations of the state (hakuma)
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Over time, these leaders came to under-
stand and appreciate how to most fruitfully position themselves vis-à-vis state representa-
tives to maximize their own agency as de facto rulers at the local level. In so doing, they
played an important and strategic role in managing the production of knowledge by both
the hakuma and its citizens.
This emerging class of brokers between ‘life worlds’ has not simply been a prominent
feature of twentieth century governance in parts of southern Sudan, Uganda and Somalia
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but of the modern development enterprise (Mosse and Lewis 2006; Rossi 2006). A key
feature of bunkerization has been the transfer of responsibility for administration and
operations to national staff and organizations. The selection of such ‘local’ brokers by
international donors and INGOs, though, has been premised on a similar rationale to
those of colonial and proto-colonial administrators: perceived ability to mobilize and rep-
resent communities, but familiarity with the world of the international.6 Moreover, as Clare
Paine has demonstrated in the case of northern Uganda, for example, for some modern
brokers an attempt to fit the profile of those of old ones—in this case the ‘paramount
chief’—has sometimes been a key strategy for building credibility with, and securing
resources from, international interveners (Paine 2015).
The intention of this overview is not to suggest that contemporary bunkerization prac-
tices are simply an unconscious extension of historic statebuilding enterprises. Nor is it to
imply that international intervention is heavily informed by the same militaristic, imperial-
ist logics as the European, Turco-Egyptian and Ethiopian colonizers and expansionists
highlighted above. The drawing of these parallels nevertheless underscores the enduring
character of the state in many central/eastern African peripheries. That is to say, forms of
engagement and interaction between state authority and local communities in many of
these regions today continues to reflect the same logics of militarization and remoteness
that informed initial encounters in the nineteenth century.
This is a crucial lens through which to view the practices of modern international inter-
veners, since development interventions do not occur unilaterally—they must, at the very
least, come to some form of accommodation with the formal state authorities. In some
cases this is a question of registration or permission, while in others a more regulated
and continued negotiation of access is required. This applies particularly to UN and inter-
national donor agencies but also to INGOs, whose de-registration and expulsion by state
authorities has occurred, and been observed, in Darfur, SRS and elsewhere in the last
decade.
The point, then, is that intervention does not occur in a vacuum—the state may be
largely absent in the borderland but is still recognized, and usually referred to, as the pre-
siding authority and determiner of movement and operation by internationals. The extent
to which states in eastern/central Africa have shaped and managed the character of inter-
national interventionary presence in line with a persistent historical modus operandi of
militarized encounters and remote governance is therefore a central, and largely unex-
plored, question. The degree to which interventions undergird these deleterious forms
of rule in the African periphery—albeit unconsciously—is also a crucial normative
concern that arises herein. The remainder of this paper will explore this in the context
of Ethiopia’s SRS region.
Bunkerization in the Ogaden
Internationals in SRS: a brief overview
Contemporary Ethiopia is administratively a federal state divided, since 1991, into nine
regional states. Under the current Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) ruling coalition, regional states have been created along ethnic lines as a
means to break links with previous regimes perceived to have been highly centralized,
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dominated by an Amhara elite and unrepresentative of ethnic groups outside the high-
land ‘core’ of the country (Abbink 2011).
One such state is SRS in the eastern part of Ethiopia, one of the largest in the country in
terms of both area and population. Annexed to Ethiopia by the former Abyssinian empire
in the late nineteenth century, the region once known as the ‘Ogaden’ has remained on
the margins of the Ethiopian polity both physically and politically ever since. Though gov-
erned by a native Somali administration in the town of Jijiga theoretically elected by
Somali Ethiopians, the region’s rulers have in fact largely been the de facto appointees
of the increasingly authoritarian federal government in Addis Ababa via its Ministry of
Federal Affairs (MoFedA) since the 1990s and, indeed, (largely northern Tigrayan) Ethio-
pian military commanders (Hagmann 2005a, 516–517, 522, 2005b, 2014; Khalif and Door-
nbos 2002). This is not to say that regional officials have not been able to carve out agency
in their relations with their federal counterparts, though it is clear that their authority
derives from above rather than from below.
SRS remains one of the poorest parts of Ethiopia and has received minimal investment
from the federal government in terms of infrastructure and other forms of support. Econ-
omically, the region is largely dominated by pastoralists—a way of life federal officials, like
their predecessors under the socialist Derg (1974–91) and imperial regimes (overthrown in
1974), find difficult to understand, leading to the latter’s support for a range of clumsy and
deleterious ‘villagization’ and sedentarization programmes in the area (Hagmann and
Mulugeta 2008). This perspective has fed into a broader view among Ethiopia’s highland
rulers of SRS as a terra nullis requiring subjugation and civilizing (Clapham 2002).
The marginalization and under-development of the region has also been exacerbated
by conflict in recent decades, with the secessionist Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF)—ruling party of SRS between 1992 and 1994—having waged a violent separatist
campaign since leaving the EPRDF coalition in the early 1990s. The ONLF insurgency has
been met with equal brutality by the Ethiopian military and the regional government’s—
initially informalized—special forces, the liyu police.
SRS has also largely been among Ethiopia’s more neglected regions for international
donors. This lack of interest has nevertheless begun to change since a major drought and
famine struck the wider region between 2011 and 2012. Recent years have seen a
number of states establish—or explore the possibility of establishing—longer-term devel-
opment interventions in this part of Ethiopia. Most notably, the UK’s Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID) launched a multi-million pound ‘Peace and Development
Programme’ (PDP) in the early 2010s (initially as an inception mission, though operational
in part since 2013) focused on four components—service delivery, fostering of greater pro-
fessionalism and accountability in the security and justice sectors, assisting in the creation of
livelihood opportunities for pastoralist communities, and improving governance. DFID oper-
ations aremanaged by a consortium of INGOs and NGOs under Save the Children, including
the International Rescue Committee, Islamic Relief, Ogaden Welfare and Development
Association, Mercy Corps, Oxfam and ZOA (DFID 2013). Since 2013, the German and
Swiss development agencies (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit
(GIZ) and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)) have begun to plan for,
and trial, interventions focused around capacity-building for drought resilience among
Somali-Ethiopian communities, while the US—Ethiopia’s leading bilateral donor, but a rela-
tively minor player in SRS—has primarily focused on food and water security programmes.7
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A number of UN relief agencies operate in the region, particularly focusing around
refugee camps, notably the World Food Programme (WFP) which is housed in defensive
compounds in Gode, Dollo Ado and Degehabur. United Nations High Commission for Refu-
gees (UNHCR) also has an office in Jijiga—the regional capital—and the UN runs a small
‘guest house’ there for visiting international staff (UNDSS Ethiopia 2014). Though UN secur-
ity advisers and liaisons are stationed in a number of these locations, they are invariably
‘national’ rather than international in origin. Finally, the World Bank has run a commu-
nity-based development programme for the region’s pastoralists (the Pastoral Community
Development Project, PCDP) since 2003. Most of these programmes are implemented by
the federal or regional government or by the many humanitarian INGOs and NGOs in
the region, most notably Mercy Corps, Oxfam, Save the Children and ZOA together with
a range of consultancy groups, implementing agencies and security outfits.8
Drivers of bunkerization: the role of the Ethiopian state
The difficulties of accessing many parts of SRS together with the perceived high level of
insecurity there arguably render it an ideal candidate for bunkerization behaviour and
mentalities among international actors. Indeed, at one level there appears to be a high
level of militarization and remoteness in the character of international interactions with
civilians, communities and organizations in the region.
Few internationals are permanently based in SRS, and visits by international personnel
are often heavily restricted by a donor/agency headquarters for both security and practical
reasons. Indeed, according to interviewees, brief trips beyond Jijiga are often made only
with Ethiopian military escorts and equipment, or with UN logistical support—often in
the form of reinforced vehicles or helicopters.9
Several donors, notably the World Bank, rely heavily on UN security recommendations
and advice with regard to sending internationals into the area even for short trips;10 the
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) provides a weekly précis of security ‘inci-
dents’ across the country for interested actors and advises internationals, and a number of
other communities, on the perceived relative risks of travelling to particular areas. The pro-
posed German‒Swiss intervention noted above was to proceed only after the completion
of a risk assessment exercise undertaken by an external consultant—whose report, which
was in the process of being written at the time of the fieldwork, sets the parameters for this
initiative—and, indeed, was to define GIZ and SDC’s understanding of the SRS context.11
Moreover, the UN presence in the region takes its most prominent form in militarized
compounds; bunkered structures surrounded by barbed wire separating local and inter-
national space. For international consultants and NGO personnel working in the region
(usually under the commission of the UN, an international donor or an INGO), UNDSS or
other institutional security advice has often compelled these actors to remain behind com-
pound walls—particularly in Gode—for much (if not all, as one consultant interviewed
noted) of a trip to the region.12
In terms of operations, international actors rely heavily upon their Ethiopian govern-
ment counterparts, both civilian and military, in some contexts to deliver aspects of
their programmes in the region. A 2010 review of development interventions in the
region, for example, noted that WFP ‘hands over all relief food to the Government of Ethio-
pia at the time of its arrival… in the country [for distribution]’ (DAG Ethiopia 2010, 22).
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International encounters are also characterized by a strong degree of remoteness. Visits
by internationals to the region are usually brief and heavily circumscribed. Current and
former diplomats, consultants and humanitarian personnel have described how their
trips have largely focused around meetings with regional state political and judicial offi-
cials (often in Jijiga) as well as with diaspora returnees from Europe and representatives
of INGOs and implementing agencies tasked with delivering donor programmes. Encoun-
ters with ‘locals’ who are not part of the state elite (federal or regional) or the develop-
ment community are therefore extremely rare.
International donor-funded interventions are also largely implemented, and often eval-
uated, by increasingly distant chains of consortia and implementing agencies, often run
and managed by local NGOs. On the one hand, this increases room for local agency in
the management of these programmes. On the other hand, however, it expands the phys-
ical, emotional and epistemological gap between the life worlds of internationals and
locals. This leads to an arguably circular and restricted production of knowledge. In a Sep-
tember 2013 review of the nascent PDP, for example, DFID officials did not incorporate a
field visit in their evaluation, but instead held meetings with implementing partners and
representatives of the Ethiopian state to inform their analysis (DFID Ethiopia 2013, 8).
This was considered justifiable given the very early stage of the PDP’s development and
operationalization at that time. The episode nonetheless reflects the more general charac-
ter of international involvement in the region, where chains of organizations not only help
design and implement interventions but also represent the primary (sometimes sole)
sources of information on the region and its peoples for their international interlocutors.
This has both epistemological and practical consequences, as Sandstrom (2014) has simi-
larly noted in relation to internationals’ ‘remoteness’ in Afghanistan.
One should, of course, be careful about essentializing international engagement in SRS.
Security and visit protocols, risk assessment guidelines and training requirements vary
considerably across headquarters and are rarely observed to the letter by international
staff who travel to the region in person. Likewise, it was clear from interviews that
many of the latter have sought to resist or work around such HQ-imposed restrictions
and that a number relied more on their own extensive experience of working in SRS—
and networks developed therein—to ensure their own safety.13 As Felix da Costa and
Karlsrud (2013) have noted in relation to South Sudan, there is also some evidence of inter-
nationals seeking to establish ‘ways to stay’ in the region when this is against the broader
security protocols.
The provenance of this general bunkerization behaviour, however, is open to question.
For while HQ diktats and a generalized culture of risk clearly shape the form of inter-
national intervention in SRS for many interviewees, the role of the Ethiopian state was
more often highlighted. Attempts to establish a permanent, non-militarized footing in
the region by one major donor in recent years, for example, were rebuffed by Addis
Ababa.14 A range of personnel from a variety of organizations also noted that Ethiopian
military escorts were in fact imposed sine qua non for many internationals seeking to
travel beyond Jijiga—and that permission to do so would be denied or vehicles turned
around at roadblocks otherwise.15
Moreover, many interviewees claimed that building the Ethiopian state (sometimes
including, usually indirectly, the military) into the implementation of interventions was,
in fact, often a prerequisite for the state’s granting of approval for the programme to
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take place. Internationals universally noted that their interventions had to be fully
‘aligned’ with the Government of Ethiopia’s (GoE) National Development Plan in order
to be approved and permitted to operate.16 Most interviewees could also recall at least
one occasion during their tenure when the GoE had ‘refused’ project or programme
aid or expelled a colleague when the interventions proposed or part-implemented had
not fitted into the Plan.17 Many stressed that their interventions were allowed to take
place only through the existing state apparatus, with a range of state coordination
bodies, notably MoFedA and the Bureau of Pastoral Affairs.18 Moreover, one donor official
noted that his programme had needed to agree with the GoE beforehand which woredas
(the smallest unit of local government in Ethiopia) the project would operate in with a
range being ‘jointly agreed’ as too dangerous to enter.19
The Ethiopian state’s management of space which internationals can access in SRS has
been a central and longstanding characteristic of its engagement with this community and
represents, in part, a strategic attempt to prevent the production of a non-EPRDF-sanc-
tioned knowledge on the insurgency and counter-insurgency.20 State officials heavily
restricted humanitarian access to parts of SRS at the height of the ONLF insurgency
between 2007 and 2008 and expelled a number of organizations viewed as assisting
the group (including Medecins sans Frontiers, MSF) (Binet et al. 2011). Many have only
recently returned at the time of writing. In the name of balance and providing a
broader context, it should be noted that UN and other internationals also became the
targets of increased numbers of kidnappings, killings and other violence by the ONLF
during this period (Powell 2007; Voice of America 2011).
At the time of fieldwork fewer restrictions existed, although respondents emphasized
the non-negotiability of international access to parts of SRS cited as international no-go
areas by officials in Jijiga and Addis Ababa. Both the PDP and the World Bank’s PDCP, for
example, were allowed to proceed only in areas specifically agreed with state officials
with certain proposed locations ‘bluntly’ refused by Ethiopian state interlocutors.
Addis Ababa has also imposed strict thematic limits on donor involvement—with the
Safety and Justice element of DFID’s PDP being suspended a fortnight into its design
phase owing to the perceived sensitivity of the topic.21 One senior official opined
that ‘the security services saying no’ represented the biggest impediment to access
in most of the region while several consultants and donor officials argued that they
had been able to move more freely in Afghanistan and Somalia than in much of SRS
for similar reasons.22
Importantly, the GoE’s management of international space has also been comple-
mented by an attempt to manage network building by internationals—and thus
‘sources’ of knowledge. Virtually all respondents described the complexities of building
links in the region beyond groups and actors aligned with the military or regional/
federal government. A particular concern in this regard was the military and political
establishment’s frequent flagging of particular communities as being linked to, or sym-
pathizers of, the ONLF and thus ‘out of bounds’ to internationals. Many respondents
noted that the vagaries of this messaging discouraged internationals from seeking to
establish unmediated relationships with those in SRS.23 Several international officials
highlighted the frequent insistence of the regional government that its advisers accom-
pany them on any trips in the State and that only its approved staff, including
interpreters, be used. Indeed, one official noted that an attempt to add an additional
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interpreter to the security escort selected by regional officials on one such trip led to a
heated and sustained disagreement.24
To some extent, this promotion of more militarized and remote encounters between
internationals and locals by the Ethiopian authorities is a consequence of several
aspects of Ethiopian political culture. Firstly, successive Ethiopian regimes have operated
within a context of institutionalized secrecy, suspicion of external actors and reluctance to
share information unnecessarily (Hansen 2006; Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). This has been
augmented under the current EPRDF regime, which came to power largely without inter-
national support and emerged from a disciplined and necessarily secretive guerrilla
movement.
Moreover, the EPRDF has relied heavily upon international donor support since early
in its tenure and has worked hard to limit international exposure of issues, such as
counter-insurgency tactics in SRS, which might imperil this assistance (Fisher 2013).
Finally, the EPRDF has adopted a resolutely independent approach to domestic policy
—promoting a coherent and comprehensive vision for a top-down ‘developmental
state’.25
Within this dispensation, development policy has been viewed as something which
should be largely state-owned and which international actors should either align with
or take their funding elsewhere (Dereje 2011; Furtado and Smith 2009). This focus on own-
ership and independence—dubbed ‘Ethiopian exceptionalism’ by one interviewee26—
can partly be explained by the ideological robustness of the EPRDF regime and its leader-
ship (at least until 2012) coupled with Ethiopia’s history as one of Africa’s only states not to
have been colonized (the brief Italian occupation during the Second World War notwith-
standing). Cultural suspicion of the intentions of foreign powers within the Ethiopian elite
also contribute to this way of thinking of and engaging with the outside world; as one
Ethiopian official argued, ‘in Africa, the problem is that if you are weak you will be
manipulated’.27
One cannot, however, discount the influence of historical practices of statebuilding by
Ethiopian administrations in the region now known as SRS on contemporary practice. For
while the EPRDF’s overall approach to statebuilding differs markedly from its Marxist and
imperial predecessors, engagement in the Ogaden differs little (Hagmann and Korf 2012).
Indeed, as one SRS state official suggested, ‘the main difference for many in the region
under EPRDF is that the soldiers are Tigrayan not Amhara’—a reference to the initial recon-
stitution of the Ethiopian military around the Tigrayan TPLF under the EPRDF, and the con-
tinued prominence of TPLF figures in the higher ranks of the military in particular.28 As
Hagmann notes, ‘successive Ethiopian regimes perceived government action in the
Somali Region primarily in military rather than political terms’ (Hagmann 2005a, 512).
In this context, it is possible to link Ethiopian state approaches to governing SRS to bun-
kerization behaviour among international interveners. For Ethiopian officials, the modus
operandi of engaging the region has historically focused around militarized and distant
encounters and this has been the behaviour promoted by Addis Ababa and Jijiga
among external actors. That is to say, the bunkerization of aid in this region has not
simply been a donor-driven phenomenon. International bunkerization in SRS is instead
most usefully seen as an historical form of engagement between state actors and local
communities now reproduced among external interveners at the instigation of their Ethio-
pian state hosts.
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Concluding thoughts: sovereignty, peripheries and statebuilding in the
era of bunkerization
When presenting this article’s argument in a range of settings in Africa, Europe and North
America during 2014–16, one qualification suggested by several thoughtful respondents
focused around the strength or hardness of the state concerned. Thus, where state
drivers of international bunkerization could be convincingly argued for in strong states
—such as Ethiopia, Rwanda or Sri Lanka—the story was less persuasive in the case of
weaker ones.
While accepting the different degrees of influence state actors have on the behaviour of
internationals in their territories, this article has nonetheless sought to construct its argu-
ment less around the strength or weakness of a state and more around how peripheries
and borderlands have been incorporated into these states. It has then explored how exter-
nal relations with local communities during and since this period of incorporation have
come to be reproduced by successive administrations and international interveners.
This focus on borderlands allows for the incorporation of traditionally ‘strong’ states
such as Ethiopia into the analysis alongside weaker ones such as Sudan and Chad. More-
over, this approach acknowledges the growing ambivalence among Africanist scholars on
the degree of choice exercised by African states (including inter alia Uganda, DRC and
South Sudan) in projecting strong or weak state presence in parts of their territories
(Fisher 2014; Schomerus and de Vries 2014).
In highlighting the agency of African states in driving the bunkerization process the
study does not, of course, deny the prominence and provenance of Western actors,
mind-sets and norms—some of which can indeed be argued to flow from colonial men-
talities and structurings of space, sovereignty and the ‘other’. Nor does it seek to deny the
complex interactions between historical patterns of behaviour and engagement and the
conscious, intended actions of individual state actors and groups in the present. The aim of
the article has been to highlight the state role in a process so far understood primarily in
terms of novelty and Western agency rather than to resolve the structure‒agency debate.
The article’s findings nonetheless raise broader, more challenging questions for the
international intervention community. The Ethiopian state has not been alone in promot-
ing bunkerized behaviour—Karlsrud and Felix da Costa (2013), for example, highlight the
role of the Chadian state in imposing military escorts on humanitarian workers in its
eastern periphery. Goodhand (2010) emphasizes the Sri Lankan government’s successful
politicization and securitization of the presence of humanitarian organizations in that
country during, and since, its civil war. Indeed, state restrictions on the movement and
remits of internationals have increased considerably in recent decades and many states,
including Sudan, Rwanda, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have become steadily
more confident in their use of sovereignty norms to expel or circumvent the activities
of external actors on their soil (Fisher 2015; Magone, Neuman, and Weissman 2012; Tull
2010). This raises questions not only about the plight of increasing numbers of commu-
nities cut off from humanitarian assistance but about how those in the policy and huma-
nitarian world can access ‘ground truth’, in Duffield’s words, on these communities—and
thus even identify a humanitarian crisis in the first instance.
In the case of SRS, international respondents often discussed their approach to enga-
ging in the region in terms of doing it ‘their [the GoE’s] way’ but pushing ‘little by
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little’ for greater room or undertaking ‘what we can get away with’. However, the quand-
ary is where internationals should draw the line in terms of allowing their incorporation
into statebuilding practices in parts of the South as vehicles for possible future greater
humanitarian or developmental autonomy. A number of respondents, for example, felt
uncomfortable about the perceived link between international intervention and the
GoE’s sedentarization programmes, while others highlighted recent accusations of pro-
posed UK funding for liyu paramilitaries in SRS (Quinn 2013; see above).
It is increasingly apparent that a range of polities now view the international system as
something to be incorporated into a broader process of—often semi-authoritarian—sta-
tebuilding rather than a set of ad hoc actors to be negotiated with bilaterally and period-
ically (Fisher and Anderson 2015). Across eastern and central Africa particularly, many
states no longer permit interveners the ‘choice’ of supporting them or engaging in
other activities outside of their structures. This trajectory is not without its advantages
of course—greater humanitarian and developmental coordination can be a positive
thing even in semi-authoritarian states, depending on the commitment of these states’
governments to delivering humanitarian and developmental goods and resources. More-
over, from a normative perspective, one could argue that unsupervised and untrammelled
interventions by international actors is anachronistic, neo-colonial and should, indeed, be
a thing of the past.
Ultimately, though, this article has not linked bunkerization and remoteness to the
empowerment of communities and citizens in Africa but to longstanding processes of mili-
tarized governance and statebuilding by national elites and their colonial predecessors.
Many of the contemporary governments being referred to in this regard are building
their states around rent-seeking, particularism, exclusion and oppression, delivering
macroeconomic growth, in many cases, but distributing the dividends quite unequally
(Jones, Soares de Oliveira, and Verhoeven 2013). International actors working in these
countries and regions must therefore increasingly face up to the fact that their interven-
tions form part of a broader enterprise—the creation of illiberal and ultimately deeply
unstable authoritarian states.
Notes
1. See, for example, data available at https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/country and
https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/contexts.
2. Duffield acknowledges this critique in his work (2010, 470).
3. Themodern ‘Sudan’ in this section refers to the territory internationally recognized as the Repub-
lic of Sudan between 1956–2011 and includeswhat became the Republic of South Sudan in 2011.
4. Discussions with six former SPLM insurgents, Addis Ababa, 8 March 2014 and 27 April 2015.
5. Interview with former senior Ugandan security official and army officer, Kampala, 25 April 2013
6. (On the latter) Interview with UK official 1, Addis Ababa, 5 March 2014; Interview with World
Bank official 1, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2014; Interview with US official, Addis Ababa, 11 March
2014; Interview with Swiss officials 1 and 2, Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014; Interview with
German implementing agency official, 12 March 2014; Interview with risk analysis consultant
working in SRS, Addis Ababa, 13 March 2014; Interview with UN official 1, Addis Ababa, 14
March 2014; Interviews with UN officials 1, 2 and 3, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Discussion
with five employees of implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral donors in
SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and
UN official 4, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014.
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7. Interview with US official, Addis Ababa, 11 March 2014; Interview with Swiss officials 1 and 2,
Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014; Interview with German implementing agency official, Addis
Ababa, 12 March 2014.
8. Interview with European consultant (formerly commissioned by bilateral donor agency to
work in SRS) 1, by telephone, 17 February 2014; Interview with World Bank official 1, Addis
Ababa, 7 March 2014; Interview with UN official 1, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Interviews
with UN officials 1, 2 and 3, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Interview with World Bank official
2, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Discussion with five employees of implementing agency
working for multilateral and bilateral donors in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Discussion
with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014.
9. Interview with UN official 1, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Interviews with UN officials 1, 2 and
3, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Discussion with five employees of implementing agency
working for multilateral and bilateral donors in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Discussion
with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014.
10. Interview with World Bank official 1, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2014. Larger bilateral missions such
as those of the US, UK and Germany appear less reliant upon UN Department of Safety and
Security (UNDSS) advice, though they depend on similar information compiled from their
own security sources.
11. Ibid.; Interview with Swiss officials 1 and 2, Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014; Interview with
German implementing agency official, Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014; Interview with risk analy-
sis consultant working in SRS, Addis Ababa, 13 March 2014.
12. Interviewwith European consultant (formerly commissioned by bilateral donor agency to work
in SRS) 1, by telephone, 17 February 2014; Interviewwith risk analysis consultantworking in SRS,
Addis Ababa, 13 March 2014; Interview with UN official 1, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Discus-
sion with five employees of implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral donors
in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18March 2014; Discussionwith three INGOofficials, UK officials 2 and 3 and
UN official 4, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with European consultant (formerly com-
missioned by bilateral donor agency to work in SRS) 2, Nairobi, 14 July 2014.
13. Interviewwith European consultant (formerly commissioned by bilateral donor agency to work
in SRS) 1, by telephone, 17 February 2014; Interviewwith risk analysis consultantworking in SRS,
Addis Ababa, 13 March 2014; Interview with UN official 1, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014; Discus-
sion with five employees of implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral donors
in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18March 2014; Discussionwith three INGOofficials, UK officials 2 and 3 and
UN official 4, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with European consultant (formerly com-
missioned by bilateral donor agency to work in SRS) 2, Nairobi, 14 July 2014.
14. Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4, Addis Ababa, 18
March 2014.
15. Discussion with five employees of implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral
donors in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with World Bank official 2, Addis Ababa,
18 March 2014; Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4,
Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with European consultant (formerly commissioned
by bilateral donor agency to work in SRS) 2, Nairobi, 14 July 2014.
16. Discussion with five employees of implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral
donors in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with World Bank official 2, Addis Ababa,
18 March 2014; Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4, Addis
Ababa, 18March 2014; Interviewwith European consultant (formerly commissioned by bilateral
donor agency towork in SRS) 2, Nairobi, 14 July 2014; InterviewwithUKofficial 1, Addis Ababa, 5
March 2014; InterviewwithWorld Bank official 1, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2014; Interviewwith US
official, Addis Ababa, 11 March 2014; Interview with Swiss officials 1 and 2, Addis Ababa, 12
March 2014; Interviews with UN officials 1, 2 and 3, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014.
17. Discussion with five employees of implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral
donors in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with World Bank official 2, Addis Ababa,
18 March 2014; Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4,
Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with European consultant (formerly commissioned
JOURNAL OF INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING 17
by bilateral donor agency to work in SRS) 2, Nairobi, 14 July 2014; Interview with UK official 1,
Addis Ababa, 5 March 2014; Interview with World Bank official 1, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2014;
Interview with US official, Addis Ababa, 11 March 2014; Interview with Swiss officials 1 and 2,
Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014; Interviews with UN officials 1, 2 and 3, Addis Ababa, 14 March
2014.
18. Discussion with five employees of implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral
donors in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with World Bank official 2, Addis Ababa,
18 March 2014; Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4, Addis
Ababa, 18March 2014; Interviewwith European consultant (formerly commissioned by bilateral
donor agency towork in SRS) 2, Nairobi, 14 July 2014; InterviewwithUKofficial 1, Addis Ababa, 5
March 2014; InterviewwithWorld Bank official 1, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2014; Interviewwith US
official, Addis Ababa, 11 March 2014; Interview with Swiss officials 1 and 2, Addis Ababa, 12
March 2014; Interviews with UN officials 1, 2 and 3, Addis Ababa, 14 March 2014.
19. Interview with World Bank official 1, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2014.
20. For other regional examples of this phenomenon, see Fisher (2014) on Uganda and Pottier
(2002) on Rwanda.
21. Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4, Addis Ababa, 18
March 2014.
22. Interview with Swiss officials 1 and 2, Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014.
23. Discussion with five employees of implementing agency working for multilateral and bilateral
donors in SRS, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with World Bank official 2, Addis Ababa,
18 March 2014; Discussion with three INGO officials, UK officials 2 and 3 and UN official 4,
Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014; Interview with UK official 4, Nairobi, 10 July 2014; Interview
with European consultant (formerly commissioned by bilateral donor agency to work in
SRS) 2, Nairobi, 14 July 2014.
24. Interview with German implementing agency official, Addis Ababa, 12 March 2014.
25. Interviews with senior Ethiopian officials 1, 2 and 3, Addis Ababa, 1 and 2 March 2013, with
senior Ethiopian official 4, Nairobi, 21 October 2014 and with senior Ethiopian officials 5
and 6, Addis Ababa, 27 April 2015.
26. Interview with World Bank official 2, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2014.
27. Interview with senior Ethiopian official 3, 2 March 2014, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
28. Interview with SRS official, Addis Ababa, 19 March 2014.
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